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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
Vanilla case and Section 230 of the Correction Law. The instant case clearly
settles the fact that time off earned by good behavior may reduce only the
minimum term of an indeterminate sentence, and it clarifies the Court's position
in the Vanilla case.
R.D.S.
POWER TO IMPOSE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE DEPENDENT UPON CURRENT
PSYCHIATRIC EXAmINATION
In New York, a sexual psychopath may be given an indeterminate
sentence at the discretion of the judge upon conviction of a related crime. This
sentencing may not be imposed without a psychiatric examination containing
"all facts and findings necessary to assist the Court in imposing sentence."'
' s
The Code of Criminal Procedure regulates the procedure and reporting of the
examination. 22 The relator, in People ex rel. Lawson v. Denno,2 3 was convicted
of the crime of rape and was serving an indeterminate sentence imposed by
the trial judge on an examination given prior to conviction. Relator petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the power of the court to do this.
In People v. Spry,24 the Appellate Division construed these statutory
provisions to require such an examination subsequent to conviction of the
crime in order to assist the court in imposing sentence. In further refinement of
this rule, the Court of Appeals said, in People v. Alvich, 25 that every departure
from this requirement will not deprive the court of the power to sentence, but
that substantial compliance with its essential requirements is sufficient. In that
case there was a continuing examination and observation prior to conviction and
up to the time of sentencing. The issue presented in People ex rel. Lawson v.
Denno20 was whether a psychiatric examination given prior to conviction would
be within the substantial compliance rule.
The writ of habeas corpus was granted by the Supreme Court 27 on the
basis that as the examination was for the purpose of assisting the court in
sentencing such a defendant, the statute contemplates the holding of the
examination following conviction, and that a failure to comply with this
requirement would deprive the court of the power to impose an indeterminate
sentence. The Appellate Division28 reversed the granting of the writ on the
basis of People v. Alvichz29 as there was substantial compliance with the
essential requirements of the statute. The Court of Appeals reversed this order
of the Appellate Division and remanded for resentencing according to Section
2189-a of the Penal Law. The Court said that while strict compliance with the
21. N.Y. Penal Law § 2189(a).
22. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 658-661, 662(e).
23. 9 N.Y.2d 181, 212 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1961).
24. 5 A.D.2d 835, 170 N.Y.S.2d (2d Dep't 1958).
25. 7 N.Y.2d 125, 196 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959).
26. Supra note 23.
27. 196 N.Y.S.2d 314 (County Ct. 1959).
28. 10 A.D.2d 978, 201 N.Y.S.2d 905 (2d Dep't 1960).
29. Supra note 25.
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statute is not necessary under the Alvick case, the Court was there considering
the method of obtaining the psychiatric report; whereas, here it was not the
method that was challenged, but the failure to obtain it at the essential time.
The Court is not restricting the decision in the Alvich case but taking that
rule as broadly stated there and further defining it. The examination is
irrelevant to the conviction but is required to aid the judge in exercising his
discretion as to whether to impose a determinate or indeterminate sentence.
The requirement is, therefore, that the report submitted to the judge be current
according to this statutory purpose. The examination given aften the indictment
is mainly for the purpose of determining whether the defendant is sane and
capable of understanding the charges against him. As such it is hardly sufficient
for the purpose of sentencing. The manner and method of obtaining the report
may be satisfied by substantial compliance with the statute, but there may be
no deviation from the rule that the report be current.
Bd.
"PRESUPTION OF CONCURRENCE" OF SENTENCES STRICTLY LIMITED
When a defendant in a criminal proceeding is convicted of more than one
offense, the trial court has the discretionary power to impose cumulative rather
than concurrent sentences.30 Some courts have held that where the trial judge
failed to specifically exercise his discretion and failed to state that the sentences
imposed were consecutive, a presumption arose that the terms were to be
concurrent.31 These decisions were based upon an extension of the Court of
Appeals' holding in People v. Ingber.3 2 In that case, however, the Court only
stated that when a defendant sentenced at the same time for two or more
offenses had been tried at the same term of court before the same judge, and
where the judge omitted through inadvertence to make the terms successive,
there was a presumption that the terms were meant to be concurrent.83
In Browne v. New York State Board of Parole,8 4 the Court of Appeals
construed Ingber strictly, reversing both the Appellate Division"5 and Special
Terms6 decisions based on the broader interpretations of that opinion. Pe-
titioner, who was on probation following sentencing as a youthful offender for
the misdemeanor of attempted extortion, was subsequently convicted of at-
tempted sodomy, first degree robbery, first degree grand larceny and second
and third degree assault. He was sentenced to an indefinite term on each count,
the sentences to run concurrently and not consecutively, but no reference was
made to his prior sentence for the misdemeanor which was still outstanding.
30. N.Y. Penal Law § 2190; People v. Ingber, 248 N.Y. 302, 162 N.E. 87 (1928).
31. E.g., People ex rel. Winelander v. Denno, 9 A.D.2d 898, 195 N.Y.S.2d 165 (2d
Dep't 1959); People ex rel. Gerbino v. Ashworth, 267 App. Div. 579, 47 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1st
Dep't 1944).
32. Supra note 30.
33. Id. at 305, 162 N.E. at 88.
34. 10 N.Y.2d 116, 218 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961).
35. 25 Misc. 2d 1050, 207 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
36. -A.D.2d-, 211 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (2d Dep't 1961).
